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1 Introduction
One of the main features of the financial crises of the nineties was their ten-
dency to spread across countries. The Mexican devaluation of 1994 aﬀected
other Latin American countries (the Tequila eﬀect); the currency crisis in
Thailand of July 1997 spread across East Asia; several months after the
Russian crisis of August 1998, the Brazilian crisis ended up with the floata-
tion of Real.
In this paper we model investors’ behavior as aﬀected by (a slow moving)
external habit based on past aggregate consumption (see Abel (1990) and
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) rather than an internal habit based on
past own consumption (see Constantinides (1990) and Sundaresan (1989)).
One of the key insights of this class of models is that as investors’ wealth
and consumption fall to the habit level, the eﬀective curvature of the utility
function increases making investors act as if they were more risk averse. This
increases the risk premium that investors need in order to hold risky assets.
Through this mechanism, financial linkages can act as an independent source
of transmission of financial crises. In fact, given a financial crisis in one
country, if the wealth of investors decreases suﬃciently they will demand
higher risk premia on assets of other countries even when the fundamentals
of these countries are unchanged. This will increase the coverage ratio,
make debt servicing more diﬃcult and trigger a financial crisis. Note that
the eﬀect of habit formation is similar to the Goldstein and Pauzner (2004)
assumption of decreasing risk aversion. However, in our model habits drive
the attitude towards risk, microfounding the decreasing risk aversion eﬀect.
It is important to remark that the traditional way of modeling investors’
behavior, i.e. by CARA preferences, cannot account for these wealth eﬀects.
With such specification of the utility function following a financial crisis
investors will increase the demand for assets whose returns are negatively
correlated to their wealth (which is lower as a consequence of the crisis) -
this, in turn, will reduce risk premia on other countries’ risky assets (ceteris
paribus) and serve to limit the spread of the crisis. However, this outcome
is counterfactual since the evidence shows that risk premia, which can be
measured by bond spreads, increase in the event of a financial crisis (see,
among others, Eichengreen et al. (2001)).
We elaborate on this behavioral approach in the context of a model of
speculative attacks with self-fulfilling expectations built on Jeanne (1997)
and Masson (1999). The paper innovates in several ways. First, it pro-
vides an explicit microeconomic foundation based on habit formation of the
investors’ behavior triggering contagion. Asymmetric information is not
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necessary to explain contagion. Second, the portfolio choices deriving from
the investor’s optimizing behavior add a further channel of contagion to the
monsoonal and spillover eﬀects introduced by Masson (1999). Finally, the
explicit modeling of the risk premium required by the investor introduces
an additional source of nonlinearity in the multiple equilibria framework.
In our model even without a trade competitiveness eﬀect crises can still be
transmitted by a feedback eﬀect on investors’ behavior.
One of the implications of this model is that it is the very nature of free
international capital movements that introduces the risk of financial conta-
gion. To see whether restrictions on such movements can reduce contagion
we consider the eﬀect of capital controls and Tobin taxes, i.e. taxes levied
on foreign exchange transactions.
The problem of contagion, or transmission of financial crises, has been
addressed by a growing body of literature in the last decade (recent surveys
include Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) and Williamson (2004)). Most of the
papers tend to split the explanations of contagion between those related to
fundamentals and those related to the investors’ behavior.
Theories of contagion based on fundamentals’ deterioration mostly refer
to trade and financial links as the main channels of transmission of shocks.
In Gerlach and Smets (1995), for example, contagion occurs through a loss
of competitiveness of country B as a consequence of the devaluation of coun-
try A’s exchange rate, in a bilateral trade link framework. Glick and Rose
(1999) find that trade patterns and competitiveness on third markets can
indeed be the rationale for contagion and its regional character. On the
other hand, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) show that the role of financial
linkages among countries is crucial to understand the regional attribute of
the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Latin American troubles of 1994-95. This
may be due to the necessity of commercial banks to adjust their lending
to their lower level of wealth following a crisis in one country in order to
reduce their overall risk. Kaminsky et al. (2001) study US based mutual
funds and find evidence of feedback behavior and mutual funds selling assets
in emerging markets in the event of a crisis. Van Rijckeghem and Weder
(2001) test for the relative strength of the trade linkages and macroeco-
nomic factors as opposed to the spillovers from a common lender. They find
that financial linkages generally have predictive power even when trade and
macroeconomic factors are taken into account. Their subsequent paper, Van
Rijckeghem and Weder (2003), specifies that it is the banks’ exposure to a
crisis country that has predictive power. The intuition is that as a financial
crisis occurs in an origin country the banks with the largest exposures will
face potential losses, and hence will need to restore capital asset ratios, meet
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margin calls, or readjust risk exposures. Financial channels may work also
through simple portfolio management rules (Schinasi and Smith (2001)) and
portfolio rebalancing eﬀects may be magnified by asymmetric information
(Kodres and Pritsker (2002)). In the Russian crisis of 1998 the turmoil was
not restricted within a same regional or financial bloc, but rather spread
across countries, like Brazil, with small direct economic connections to Rus-
sia. Baig and Goldfajn (2001) find empirical support to the hypothesis of
contagion through financial links. Eichengreen et al. (2001) study the be-
havior of emerging market bonds in times of crisis and find evidence of “flight
to quality”. The literature, thus, suggests that common lenders eﬀects and
financial linkages are very important in understanding the transmission of
financial crises.
“Pure contagion” occurs when the transmission of the crisis cannot be re-
lated to changes in fundamentals. In this case contagion turns out to be the
outcome of investors’ behavior, specifically a shift in market sentiments due
to a change in risk aversion, changes in the interpretation given to existing
information that may lead to a “wake up call”, or changes in behavior due
to other considerations. In the literature the three main channels for “pure
contagion” are (i) A self-fulfilling bank run (Sachs et al. (1996), and Allen
and Gale (1998)), which leads to the ineﬃcient liquidation of assets. (ii) In-
formation acquisition (Goldstein and Pauzner (2004)) and herding behavior
(Chari and Kehoe (2004)). Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) use the idea of
global games to show that investors receive correlated signals on which they
update their beliefs. This model does not rely on multiple equilibria and
a unique probability of crisis can be calculated. The model however relies
crucially on decreasing risk aversion. They demonstrate that the strategic
interaction of investors holding equities of two diﬀerent countries can gener-
ate contagious withdrawal of money from one country (the relation of this
paper to our model is discussed further below). (iii) Jumps between multi-
ple equilibria which arise in the underlying macroeconomic model (Jeanne
(1997), Masson (1999), and Jeanne and Masson (2000)). In such situations
contagion can arise because of, or can be exacerbated by, self fulfilling beliefs
of private agents: crises spread just because agents believe they are going
to spread. For example, Masson (1999), building on Jeanne (1997), shows
that a second generation model of speculative attacks can generate multiple
equilibria as a consequence of the interaction between the government and
the private sector, with contagion eﬀects emerging as the expectations of
devaluation of a competitor country’s currency enter the model.
To sum up, the empirical literature suggests that both trade and finan-
cial linkages are important with perhaps the latter being the most important
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channel. The theoretical literature stresses that “pure contagion” is also
likely to occur. Our paper builds on this. We model contagion as arising
from investors’ behavior in full information, frictionless markets through a
feedback eﬀect based on habit formation. This is embedded in a second gen-
eration model of currency crises such that both financial and trade linkages
can be considered simultaneously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 discusses policy measures commonly regarded to as stabi-
lizing devices. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
This section derives the risk premium from an international asset pricing
model with habit formation and then embeds it into a second generation
model of currency crises à la Jeanne (1997). In modeling the investor’s be-
havior we follow closely the specification of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
There are several reasons why treating the investor as habit forming can be
justified in our context. Firstly, this specification has been used to explain
the equity premium puzzle in closed economies. Thus, a similar specifica-
tion should be used when understanding the asset prices in an open economy
context. This is a behavioral view. Secondly, if we are to interpret investors
as large financial intermediaries or large firms, then behavior similar to habit
formation may be generated. There are two diﬀerent reasons for this. The
first is that if we interpret “consumption” as payouts to claimants (either
depositors or shareholders) then financial intermediaries will not want the
payouts to drop below some level. Cuts in the level of the payout is costly.
The second is that since we can interpret the “utility function” as that of
fund managers of financial intermediaries, if the fund managers’ performance
is evaluated relative to a benchmark which depends on past average perfor-
mance, they will not want performance to fall behind the benchmark level
so that a similar behavior will be generated. There is a third class of reasons
why the habit formation can be rationalized. This has to do with portfolio
insurance and risk management practices of large investors. Under portfolio
insurance, investors do not want the value of the portfolio to fall below some
level, i.e. they do not want the withdrawals from the portfolio (consumption
in our model) to fall below some threshold. The portfolio insurance mod-
els have the similar property that as the prices of assets fall the allocation
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to them falls as well.1 The close relationship between portfolio insurance
and habit formation has already been noted in the literature (see, for exam-
ple, Campbell and Viceira (2002)). Thus, there are three entirely diﬀerent
mechanisms through which the investors’ behavior can be rationalized.2
There are N identical price-taking international investors and M coun-
tries. The time horizon is infinite. The representative international investor
maximizes the period utility flow which depends on current consumption
and is aﬀected by external habit formation.
Ut = Et
( ∞X
s=t
βs−tu(Cs −Xs)
)
(1)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available
at date t, β ∈ {0, 1} is the constant subjective time-preference factor, u(·)
is the period utility function which is assumed to be thrice-continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, i.e. u0(·) > 0, u00(·) <
0, Cs is real consumption on period s, Xs is the habit level and depends on
the history of aggregate consumption. The price of the consumption good
is normalized to 1.
Each country may issue either dollar-denominated and local currency-
denominated debt. ∗ denotes dollar-denominated variables. The period-by-
period budget constraint is given by:
B∗fs+1 +
MX
m=1
x∗ms+1B
∗m
s +
MX
m=1
xms+1
Bms
ems
=
(1 + r∗fs )B
∗f
s
+
MX
m=1
x∗ms (I
∗m
s +B
∗m
s )
+
MX
m=1
xms
µ
Ims +Bms
ems
¶
− Cs(2)
where B∗fs is the real net risk-free bond purchase at time s − 1, x∗ms and
xms are respectively the fractional shares of country m’s dollar- and local
1See Brennan and Schwartz (1988) and Grossman and Zhou (1996) for a general equi-
librium model with portfolio insurance.
2See Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) for further discussion of how such considerations
can induce decreasing risk aversion.
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currency-denominated debt purchased by the agent in period s−1, B∗ms and
Bms denote respectively the date s real market value of country m’s dollar-
and local currency-denominated debt, r∗fs is the net real interest rate on the
risk-free bond B∗fs between period s− 1 and s, I∗ms and Ims are the coupons
paid on countrym’s securities at time s, and ems is time s spot exchange rate
(price of dollars in terms of country m’s currency). Equation (2) expresses
the link between period s’s saving and period s + 1 financial wealth. One
can think of B∗fs as the net purchase of a United States Treasury bill.
The rationale for pricing the emerging market debt within the framework
of a consumption-based CAPM, usually applied to equities, is threefold.
Firstly, arbitrage on interest rates will equate returns on bonds to returns
on equities through price adjustments, according to the Fisher equation (De
La Grandville (2001), ch. 2). Secondly, if we assume that markets are
complete, then the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds and the value of the
portfolio is invariant to the debt-equity mix. Thirdly, dealing with emerging
markets bonds requires taking into account default and exchange rate risk
thus hiding the sharp distinction between stocks and bonds (Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1996), ch. 5).
Maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the constraints (2) with
respect to x∗ms+1, x
m
s+1, and B
∗f
s+1, gives the following Euler equations:
u0(Cs −Xs)B∗ms = βEs
©
u0(Cs+1 −Xs+1)
¡
I∗ms+1 +B
∗m
s+1
¢ª
(3)
u0(Cs −Xs)
Bms
ems
= βEs
½
u0(Cs+1 −Xs+1)
µ
Ims+1 +B
m
s+1
ems+1
¶¾
(4)
and
u0(Cs −Xs) = (1 + r∗fs+1)βEs
£
u0(Cs+1 −Xs+1)
¤
(5)
Define the ex post net real rates of return on country m’s dollar- and
local currency-denominated risky bond as:
r∗mt+1 ≡
I∗mt+1
B∗mt
+
B∗mt+1 −B∗mt
B∗mt
; and rmt+1 ≡
Imt+1
Bmt
+
Bmt+1 −Bmt
Bmt
Therefore, from (3), recalling that E(XY ) = Cov(X,Y ) + E(X)E(Y ),
we obtain:
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u0(Cs −Xs) = βCov
©
u0(Cs+1 −Xs+1), (1 + r∗ms+1)
ª
+βEs
£
u0(Cs+1 −Xs+1)
¤
Es(1 + r∗ms+1) (6)
Dividing both sides by u0(Cs −Xs), using (5) to substitute out
βEsu0(Cs+1−Xs+1)/u0(Cs−Xs), and rearranging, we obtain, for s = t:
Et(1 + r∗mt+1)− (1 + r
∗f
t+1) = −(1 + r
∗f
t+1)Cov
½
βu0(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
u0(Ct −Xt)
, r∗mt+1
¾
(7)
Equation (7) is the crucial expression of the consumption-based interna-
tional CAPM with habit formation. It says that, given the assumptions on
the period utility function, the risk premium on asset m depends positively
on the covariance of the asset’s return with the surplus consumption growth.
If the covariance term is negative, the risk premium will be positive, mean-
ing that the asset yields unexpectedly high returns in states of nature when
the level of surplus consumption is unexpectedly high. Therefore, the asset
does not provide a hedge against consumption fluctuations and the investor
will require an excess return with respect to the risk-free bond’s return to
be persuaded to hold the asset.
Following the same steps, from (4) we obtain:
Et
∙
emt
emt+1
(1 + rmt+1)
¸
−(1+r∗ft+1) = −(1+r
∗f
t+1)Cov
½
βu0(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
u0(Ct −Xt)
, r∗mt+1
¾
(8)
where we assume that:
Cov
½
βu0(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
u0(Ct −Xt)
, r∗ms+1
¾
= Cov
½
βu0(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
u0(Ct −Xt)
,
emt
emt+1
(1 + rmt+1)
¾
so that the risk premium is invariant across assets, either dollar- or local
currency denominated, issued by the same country.
Proposition 1 The local currency-denominated asset must yield a premium
over the riskless rate of return to compensate the investor’s risk aversion and
the exchange rate risk.
Proof. Let πmt+1 be the probability of a devaluation of country m’s
currency occurring at time t + 1, and ∆e = ln
¡
emt+1/e
m
t
¢
the proportional,
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time-invariant, extent of such devaluation, where ∆ is the diﬀerence opera-
tor. Hence, equating the l.h.s. of (7) and (8) and taking logarithms, yields:
Et(rmt+1) = Et(r
∗m
t+1) + π
m
t+1∆e
where rmt+1 ≈ ln
¡
1 + rmt+1
¢
. Adding and subtracting r∗ft+1 on the r.h.s. of the
equation above, gives:
Et(rmt+1) = r
∗f
t+1 + ρ
m
t+1 + π
m
t+1∆e (9)
where ρmt+1 ≡ Et(r∗mt+1)− r
∗f
t+1 is the risk premium given by equation (7).
We assume the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) specification for the util-
ity function with external habit formation. Thus, the utility function (equa-
tion (1)) becomes:
Ut = Et
( ∞X
s=t
βs−t
(Cs −Xs)1−γ − 1
1− γ
)
(10)
Define the surplus consumption ratio St ≡ (Ct−Xt)/Ct and let st = lnSt,
and ct = lnCt. We assume that the logarithm of the surplus follows an
AR(1) process:
st = (1− ω)s+ ωst−1 + λ(st−1)(ct − ct−1 − c) (11)
where c is the systematic component of consumption growth, with the latter
given by:
∆ct = c+ vt, vt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2).
The specification of st implies that consumption is always greater than
habit, and we can let consumption aﬀect habit diﬀerently in diﬀerent states,
as implied by λ(st−1). In other words, we allow surplus-consumption ratio
to react slowly to changes in consumption in order to keep the risk-free rate
constant and to avoid C falling short of X (see Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)). Furthermore, consumption aﬀects surplus diﬀerently in diﬀerent
states, as implied by λ(st−1). Note that the results of the paper do not
depend on the specification of the process governing the evolution of st.
We adopt the specification of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) so that the
evolution of the risk-free rate is consistent with their paper.
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Proposition 2 The risk premium is negatively related to the surplus con-
sumption ratio:
Et(r∗mt+1)− r
∗f
t+1 ≈ (1 + r
∗f
t+1)β
γ
St
Cov
½
(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
Ct
, r∗mt+1
¾
Proof. We take a second order Taylor expansion at the points Ct+1 −
Xt+1 = Ct −Xt and r∗mt+1 = Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢
of the function
G(Ct+1 −Xt+1, r∗mt+1) ≡
βu0(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
u0(Ct −Xt)
£
r∗mt+1 −E
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
the expected value of which equals the covariance entering the risk premium
in equation (7).3
G
£
Ct −Xt, Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
=
βu0(Ct −Xt)
u0(Ct −Xt)
£
Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢
−Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
= 0;
∂G
£
Ct −Xt, Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
∂(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
=
βu00(Ct −Xt)
u0(Ct −Xt)
£
Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢
−Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
= 0;
∂G
£
Ct −Xt, Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
∂r∗mt+1
=
βu0(Ct −Xt)
u0(Ct −Xt)
= β;
∂2G
£
Ct −Xt, Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
∂(Ct+1 −Xt+1)2
=
βu000(C∗t −X∗t )
u0(Ct −Xt)
£
Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢
−Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
= 0;
∂2G
£
Ct −Xt, Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
∂
¡
r∗mt+1
¢2 = 0;
3Recall that the second-order approximation to G(X,Y ) near X = X and Y = Y is:
G(X,Y ) ' G(X,Y ) +GX(X,Y )(X −X) +GY (X,Y )(Y − Y )
+
1
2
GXX(X,Y )(X −X)2 +
1
2
GY Y (X,Y )(Y − Y )2
+GXY (X,Y )(X −X)(Y − Y ).
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∂2G
£
Ct −Xt, Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
∂(Ct+1 −Xt+1)∂r∗mt+1
=
βu00(Ct −Xt)
u0(Ct −Xt)
;
Therefore:
G(Ct+1 −Xt+1, r∗mt+1) ≈ β
£
r∗mt+1 −Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
+
βu00(Ct −Xt)
u0(Ct −Xt)
·
[Ct+1 −Xt+1 − (Ct −Xt)]
£
r∗mt+1 −Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤
.(12)
Taking conditional expectations of both sides of (12), yields:
Et
£
G(Ct+1 −Xt+1, r∗mt+1)
¤
= Cov
½
βu0(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
u0(Ct −Xt)
, r∗mt+1
¾
≈ βu
00(Ct −Xt)
u0(Ct −Xt)
·
Et{[(Ct+1 −Xt+1)− (Ct −Xt)] ·£
r∗mt+1 −Et
¡
r∗mt+1
¢¤}
= β
Ctu00(Ct −Xt)
u0(Ct −Xt)
·
Cov
½
(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
Ct
, r∗mt+1
¾
.
Hence equation (7) becomes:
Et(r∗mt+1)− r
∗f
t+1 ≈ (1 + r
∗f
t+1)β
γ
St
Cov
½
(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
Ct
, r∗mt+1
¾
(13)
where
γ
St
=
−Ctu00(Ct −Xt)
u0(Ct −Xt)
denotes the local curvature of the utility function with habits.
Thus, it is clear that risk aversion is negatively related to the surplus
consumption ratio: a fall in consumption towards the habit level will in-
crease the time-varying local curvature of utility function and, hence, the
risk premium required on the country m’s asset.
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2.1 Linkages through portfolio choice
In this subsection we show how the probability of a currency crisis in one
country influences the risk premium through a wealth eﬀect. We extend to
an internationally diversified portfolio framework the log-linear approxima-
tion to the budget constraint proposed by Campbell (1993). This allows
us to relate unexpected changes in consumption to changes in expectations
about future returns.
Consider that the representative international investor’s dynamic budget
constraint (equation (2)) can be alternatively written as:
W ∗t =
¡
W ∗t−1 − Ct−1
¢
(1 + r∗wt ) (14)
where W ∗t denotes total real wealth (denominated in dollars) and (1 + r∗wt )
is defined to be the gross real return on wealth invested from period t − 1
to period t. Given international portfolio diversification, the ex post gross
return can be decomposed as follows:
(1 + r∗wt ) = q
∗f
t (1 + r
∗f
t ) +
MX
m=1
q∗mt (1 + r
∗m
t ) +
MX
m=1
qmt
ems
ems+1
¡
1 + rmt+1
¢
(15)
where q∗ft is the proportion of wealth invested in the risk-free bond and q
∗m
t
and qmt are, respectively, the proportions of wealth invested in country m’s
dollar- and local currency-denominated assets at time t − 1, implying that
q∗ft +
PM
m=1 q
∗m
t +
PM
m=1 q
m
t = 1.
Taking logarithms of expectations of both sides of (15) gives:
Et−1 (r∗wt ) ≈ log{q∗ft (1 + r∗ft ) +
MX
m=1
q∗mt exp [Et−1 (r
∗m
t )]
+
MX
m=1
qmt exp
£
Et−1 (rmt )− πmt+1∆e
¤} (16)
Proposition 3 An unexpected decrease in wealth through an unexpected fall
in current consumption and a decrease in the surplus consumption ratio,
leads to an increase in the risk premium.
Proof. Dividing (14) by W ∗t−1 and taking logarithms, we obtain:
∆w∗t ≈ r∗wt + log
£
1− exp(ct−1 − w∗t−1)
¤
(17)
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where r∗wt+1 ≈ ln
¡
1 + r∗wt+1
¢
.
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion around the mean (c − w∗) of the
second term on the right hand side of (17) we get the following approximation
to the budget constraint (14):
∆w∗t ≈ r∗wt + k +
µ
1− 1
η
¶
(ct−1 −w∗t−1) (18)
where k = log(1−exp(c−w∗))−
³
1− 1η
´
(c−w∗),
³
1− 1η
´
= − − exp(c−w
∗)
1−exp(c−w∗) ,
and η ≡ 1− exp(c− w∗).
Next, consider the equality:
∆w∗t = ∆ct + (ct−1 − w∗t−1)− (ct − w∗t ) (19)
Equating the left hand sides of (18) and (19), solving forward the result-
ing diﬀerence equation in ct−1−w∗t−1, assuming that limj−→∞ ηj
³
ct+j − w∗t+j
´
=
0, and taking expectations at time t− 1 we obtain:
ct−1 − w∗t−1 = Et−1
∞X
j=1
ηj(r∗wt−1+j −∆ct−1+j) +
ηk
1− η (20)
Finally, substitute out equation (20) into (18) and (19) to obtain:
ct −Et−1ct = (Et −Et−1)
∞X
j=0
ηjr∗wt+j
−(Et −Et−1)
∞X
j=1
ηj∆ct+j (21)
Recalling now that, by assumption, (Et − Et−1)∆ct+j = 0, for j =
1, ...,∞, equation (21) simplifies to:
ct −Et−1ct = (Et −Et−1)
∞X
j=0
ηjr∗wt+j (22)
Paraphrasing Campbell (1993), equation (22) indicates that an unex-
pected decrease in consumption today must be determined by an unexpected
reduction of return on wealth today, as shown by the first term in the sum
on the right hand side of the equation, or by news that future returns will
be lower, as shown by the remaining terms in the sum.
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The decrease in current consumption implies a decrease in the surplus
consumption ratio through equation (11), and an increase in the risk pre-
mium by Proposition 1.
Equation (22) provides the link between the risk premium and the prob-
ability of devaluation of countrym’s currency. An increase in the probability
of devaluation of country m’s currency at time t + 1 will decrease the ex-
pected return on total wealth Et
¡
r∗wt+1
¢
through equation (16) which in turn
will determine an unexpected decrease in consumption, as implied by equa-
tion (22), through bad news about future returns;4 finally, this process will
increase the excess return required by the investor through equation (13).
Notably, the increase in the risk premium will involve all assets since the
recession state will aﬀect the investor’s attitude towards risk. In the habit
formation framework, a relatively small change in expected future wealth
can lead to a large change in the risk premium. One can see this from
equation (22) and equation (13). A small change in wealth will lead to a
corresponding change in consumption from equation (22), but this can cause
a large change in the surplus consumption ratio and hence, an increase in
the risk premium (equation (13)).
2.2 Habit Formation and models of currency crises
Building on a second generation model of currency crises in the spirit of
Jeanne (1997), and Bratsiotis and Robinson (2004), we will specify now the
process through which the risk premium aﬀects the probability of devalu-
ation showing how the investor’s portfolio choice can in itself be a source
of transmission of financial crises.5 In what follows contagion is implicitly
defined as an increase in the probability of a crisis in one country given a
crisis is occurring in another country, which is equivalent to Definition 1 in
the classification proposed by Pericoli and Sbracia (2003).
Consider an emerging economy whose government pegs the currency to
the US dollar.6 As long as the country’s debt is partly denominated in local
currency, the government faces a policy dilemma as it has an incentive to
4This eﬀect can be better seen by expanding the sum on the right-hand side of equation
(22): a reduction in Et (r∗wt+1) constitutes bad news about future returns since reduces the
term θ(Et −Et−1)r∗wt+1 of the sum.
5While the risk premium is derived in an infinitely lived agents framework, the following
analysis focuses on a given two time period. This is consistent with the entire class of
models of currency crises.
6 In order to reduce notation, in this subsection we suppress the superscript denoting
the country.
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devalue in order to reduce the cost of debt. It will take any decisions about
either maintaining the peg or not by minimizing the following quadratic loss
function:7
Lt+1 = (ut+1)2 + (∆dt+1)2 + δΓt+1 (23)
where ut+1 is the unemployment rate, ∆dt+1 is the growth in government
real debt proportional to GDP, δ is a dummy variable which is equal to 1
if devaluation occurs and 0 if the peg is maintained, and Γt+1 denotes the
exogenous cost of devaluing.
We assume that the dynamics of unemployment is determined by an
expectations-augmented Phillips curve, that a relative purchasing power
parity (between the emerging market’s currency and the US dollar) holds
and that foreign prices are normalized to unity, so that ∆pt+1 = ∆e, where
∆pt+1 = ln(Pt+1/Pt) ≈ ∆Pt+1/Pt, and Pt is the domestic price level:
ut+1 = θut − ζ(∆e−Et∆e).
As there is a devaluation with probability πt+1, we see that Et∆e = πt+1∆e.
Thus, we have:
ut+1 = θut − ζ(∆e− πt+1∆e) (24)
with ζ > 0 and 0 < θ < 1. We make the further assumptions that the
rate of growth of real GDP is zero and that rt+1 = Et(rt+1) + r,t+1and
r∗t+1 = Et(r
∗
t+1) + r∗,t+1 where i ∼ i.i.d.(0, σi), for i = r, r∗ are stochastic
shocks.
To derive the deficit, we consider the budget constraint of the consoli-
dated government (including the central bank) as a proportion of GDP:
∆ bBt+1 + et(∆ bB∗t+1 −∆ bF ∗t+1)
PtYt
=
( bGt − bTt)
PtYt
+ rt+1
bBt
PtYt
+r∗t+1et
( bB∗t − bF ∗t )
PtYt
(25)
where bBt and bB∗t are the country’s currency-denominated and US dollar-
denominated stocks of bonds respectively, bFt is the amount of oﬃcial foreign
reserves, bGt and bTt are the government expenditure and taxes, PtYt is the
country’s nominal GDP, and ∧ indicates nominal variables, i.e. bX = PX.
7This loss function is similar to that in Sachs et al. (1996), among others. The present
formulation follows Jeanne (1997) and Bratsiotis and Robinson (2004).
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Denoting the country’s proportional debt as dt = Dt/Yt = ( bBt + et( bB∗t −bF ∗t ))/PtYt, then the change in d can be approximated by the total diﬀeren-
tial:
∆dt+1 =
∆ bBt+1 + et(∆ bB∗t+1 −∆ bF ∗t+1)
PtYt
− (∆pt+1) dt − et(f∗t − b∗t )∆e (26)
where f∗t = bF ∗t / (PtYt) and b∗t = bB∗t / (PtYt). Substituting equation (25)
into (26), recalling that purchasing power parity holds, and rearranging, we
obtain:
∆dt+1 = gt + ρt+1dt − (∆e− πt+1∆e) (dt + zt) (27)
where g = gt − τ t + (r∗ft+1 + r,t+1)dt + (r,t+1 − r∗,t+1) zt, zt = et(f∗t − b∗t ),
gt = bGt/ (PtYt), and τ t = bTt/ (PtYt). From equation (27) we see how an
unexpected devaluation decreases the cost of government debt by reducing
the debt service and increasing the returns on net foreign assets. It is also
evident that a rise in the risk premium increases the government deficit by
driving up the expected return on debt.
Proposition 4 The probability of devaluation of a country’s currency de-
pends on the risk premium asked by the investor on the country’s asset
Proof. The net benefit of maintaining the peg is given by the diﬀerence
between the loss functions corresponding to the devaluation and to the fixed
peg hypothesis, respectively:
V t+1 = Ldt+1 − L
f
t+1
=
h
(ut+1)d
i2
+
h
(∆dt+1)d
i2
+ Γt+1 −
h
(ut+1)f
i2
−
h
(∆dt+1)f
i2
= Γt+1 + (∆e)2
£
ζ2 + (dt + zt)
¤2 − 2θζut∆e
−2
¡
gt + ρt+1dt
¢
(dt + zt)∆e
−2
n
(∆e)2
£
ζ2 + (dt + zt)
¤2oπt+1
= Vt+1 − ϕρt+1 − απt+1 (28)
where
Vt+1 = Γt+1 +
1
2
α− 2∆e [θζut + gt (dt + zt)]
is the gross benefit of maintaining the peg,
ϕ = 2dt (dt + zt)∆e
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and
α = 2
n
(∆e)2
£
ζ2 + (dt + zt)
¤2o
Equation (28) says that the net benefit of keeping the peg depends not only
on the fundamentals, summarized by the term Vt+1, but also on the credibil-
ity of the government commitment to it, indicated by πt+1, and on the risk
aversion of the international investor, as captured by the risk premium term
ρt+1. Given the macroeconomic conditions, a lower credibility, as implied by
a higher πt+1, or a higher risk aversion, as implied by a higher ρt+1, reduces
the benefit of the peg. The decision rule of the policymaker is derived op-
timally, taking into account the probability of devaluation πt+1 formulated
by the private international investor, that is:
φt+1 = Et (Vt+1) (29)
and:
Vt+1 − φt+1 = t+1 ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ) (30)
The variable φt+1 summarizes the exogenous fundamentals aﬀecting the
probability of devaluation at time t+ 1.
The international investor, in turn, formulates rational expectations about
the probability of devaluation as depending on the net benefit of the peg
becoming negative, i.e.:
πt+1 = Pr[V t+1 < 0]
Using equations (28)−(30), the probability of devaluation may be rewritten
as:
πt+1 = Pr[t+1 < απt+1 + ϕρt+1 − φt+1]
or:
πt+1 = F [απt+1 + ϕρt+1 − φt+1] (31)
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of f(·), with the latter
being the density function of t+1.
Equation (31) implies that, even at this stage, only taking into account
the portfolio management rules of a risk-averse investor, contagious currency
crises with self-fulfilling expectations can arise; in fact, the devaluation prob-
ability of country m, for example, depends on itself and on the risk premium
on country m’s asset, the latter depending, in turn, on the probability of
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devaluation of country m’s and of all other countries in the investors’ port-
folios, as discussed above.
Notice that if we were to introduce an investor with CRRA preferences
into the Jeanne’s framework then the risk premium would be a constant.
What habit formation does is to make the risk premium vary with shocks
to expected wealth and hence to current consumption.
To give an intuitive idea of how the above model works, consider a repre-
sentative investor holding risky assets issued by two emerging-market coun-
tries as well as a risk-free bond issued by a developed country (USA is a
reasonable assumption). In keeping with the portfolio choice problems, the
investor will require a risk premium on the risky assets to hold them. The
risk premium is inversely related to unexpected changes in consumption,
which in turn depends on the devaluation probability of emerging-market
currencies. Hence, an increase in the devaluation probability of country m’s
currency will decrease the consumption of the investor who will in turn ask
for a higher risk premium on all the portfolio assets, including those of coun-
try n. This will raise the probability of devaluation of country n’s currency
through equation (31), which in turn will widen the risk premium on coun-
try m’s asset, and so forth, thus feeding a self-fulfilling expectation process.
Hence, the international transmission of financial crises relies on portfolio
re-balancing driven by wealth eﬀects, and is magnified by self-fulfilling ex-
pectations. Finally, the wealth eﬀect acts diﬀerently on the probability of
devaluation according to the amount of debt accumulated by the emerging
country, as equation (28)-(31) show.
Such a model can provide a theoretical framework useful to explain some
of the empirical evidence reported in the introduction. For example, a com-
mercial bank holding claims issued by a number of countries in the same
region (e.g. East Asia) may be hit by the devaluation of one of its debtors’
currency and see its financial wealth reduced. This may lead the bank to re-
assess the risk premium required on the bonds issued by all other countries
as a consequence of the increase in eﬀective risk aversion. The spreading
of the currency crisis to the whole region is thus triggered by an investors’
sentiment shift. On the other hand, international investors holding a ge-
ographically diversified portfolio can be induced to a reallocation of their
wealth as it is hit by a currency devaluation, consistently with the strong
correlation of emerging markets sovereign spreads documented by Baig and
Goldfajn (2001). The same model can help explain why other financial crises
did not spread from the origin country, as it happened for Argentina in 2001-
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20028. In that case, the sharp decline in the correlation between emerging
markets sovereign spreads and stock indexes can be the result of a previous
reallocation of the international investors’ portfolios away from Argentine
assets triggered by frequent signals of instability over the months preceding
December 2001, the conventional starting date of the Argentine crisis.
2.3 Market segmentation and regional contagion
Most of contagion episodes in the nineties had a regional character, involv-
ing countries belonging to the same economic and financial area, like Latin
America, East Asia and the European Monetary System. A model of conta-
gion, then, should be capable of accounting for such a feature. Our model,
indeed, is able to explain why most of financial crises tend to spread to neigh-
boring countries, at the same time as it can explain why other crises aﬀect
countries not related to the origin one. In the present model a change in the
probability of devaluation aﬀects the expected rate of return on the risky as-
set, which in turn aﬀects the total rate of return on wealth invested through
equation (16), but this eﬀect will vary in accordance with the proportion of
wealth invested in that specific asset, qmt . If markets are segmented, due to
legal, regulatory or trade reasons, then the proportion of wealth invested in
a certain country’s asset will be substantial and this will increase the eﬀect
of a change in the probability of devaluation through a higher qmt . Moreover,
the eﬀect of an unexpected change in consumption through equation (13)
will be larger the larger is the covariance of surplus-consumption with the
rate of return on that country’s asset. But, in turn, the latter is larger the
larger is the market segmentation. In fact, the investor’s consumption will
be presumably more related to the rate of returns on a specific asset as the
portfolio is not diversified eﬃciently. In other words, for the feedback mech-
anism here presented to be significant, it is important that investors have
non-negligible holdings of assets in the relevant countries and they are not
fully diversified. If investors are already on the eﬃcient frontier then losses
in one country will not lead them to re-optimize in a significant way. Shore
and White (2002) show that with external habit formation investors may be
incompletely internationally diversified. Their model focuses on the home
equity bias. The intuition is that some investors may be constrained to hold
domestic equity due to regulatory, agency or control reasons. If there is ex-
ternal habit formation, then other investors will mimic the domestic bias in
their own portfolio leading to incomplete international diversification. This
8The lack of contagious eﬀects from the Argentine crisis has been documented, among
others, by the IMF (2002) and Boschi (2005).
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idea can be extended to our model. If some investors hold assets in some
countries due to trade, regulatory or ownership reasons, then other investors
will also mimic their behavior leading to the incomplete diversification we
need in our model. Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) give an alternative expla-
nation for incomplete diversification as due to informational and operational
advantages.
Notably, the above arguments contradicts the general wisdom according
to which international investors may be concerned with the benefits of diver-
sification: contagion - the argument goes - may prevent diversification from
delivering its benefits exactly when they are needed most, that is during pe-
riods of crisis, as cross-country correlations of asset prices are significantly
higher. Quite on the contrary, the present model suggests how important is
the role of international portfolio diversification in reducing the probability
of contagion.
Alternatively, the regional feature of contagion can be explained by het-
erogeneous investors. Li and Zhong (2005) model investors with country-
specific external habit formation, which, in presence of weakly correlated
cross-country business cycle synchronization, implies country-specific risk
aversion and locally determined surplus consumption ratios. In such a frame-
work, if the business cycle is synchronized at a regional level (see, among
others, Loayza et al. (2001)), the comovement of the devaluation probabili-
ties will happen at a regional level as well.
2.4 The range of fundamentals for multiple equilibria
Jeanne (1997) illustrates the conditions under which an equation similar to
(31) may have multiple solutions. Such conditions require the fundamentals
to lie within a certain interval
¡
φ, φ
¢
. In this Subsection, following the
Jeanne’s line of argument, we show how the introduction of a risk premium
in the Jeanne’s model aﬀects the conditions for multiple equilibria and the
range of fundamentals.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the risk premium is a function of the
probability of devaluation, i.e.: ρt = h(πt). Hence, equation (31) can be
rewritten as follows:
π = F [απ + ϕh(π)− φ] (32)
where time subscripts and country superscripts are omitted for simplicity.
We assume that the density function f(·) is continuous, symmetric (i.e.
∀, f(−) = f()), and strictly increasing (decreasing) in (−∞, 0) ((0,∞))
respectively, that is it reaches its maximum at zero, where απ0+ϕh(π0) = φ.
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The possible multiplicity of equilibria arises from the fact that both sides of
equation (32) are increasing with π. Figure (1) shows the case of a unique
equilibrium and figure (2) the case of multiple equilibria.9 The 45◦ line
plots the l.h.s. of equation (32), while the curve Cφ ≡ F [απ + ϕh(π) − φ]
plots the r.h.s. Equation (32) is satisfied at the intersections of the 45◦ line
with Cφ. Following Jeanne (1997), if at its maximum the slope of Cφ is
smaller than 1, i.e. dCφdπ < 1, then it is such everywhere. Hence π is uniquely
determined by φ and strictly decreasing with it. There may be multiple
equilibria if dCφdπ > 1 at its maximum. If this necessary condition holds,
then there are two critical values of the fundamentals φ < φ such that: if
φ < φ or φ > φ, the devaluation probability π is uniquely determined by
(and strictly decreasing with) the fundamental φ. Therefore, the further
condition for having multiple equilibria is that the fundamentals φ lie in the
range
¡
φ, φ
¢
. The critical values of fundamentals φ and φ are identified by
the tangency points between the 45◦ line and Cφ (see figure (3)). Whether
these tangency points lie to the right or to the left of the point of maximum
value of the pdf f(·) cannot be determined analytically. As shown below, in
fact, whether the value of π at which Cφ is tangent to the 45◦ line lies to
the right or to the left of π0 depends on the sign of h00(π) which depends on
the sign of f 0(·) which in turn depends on whether π is on the right or on
the left of π0. Fortunately enough, it can be shown easily that the following
results are independent of where the tangency points lie with respect to π0.
Therefore, we will make the further simplifying assumptions that π > π0,
where π is the probability of devaluation corresponding to φ, and π < π0,
with π defined correspondingly. This also allows an easier comparison to
the derivation in Jeanne (1997).
We will now determine the upper bound φ and lower bound φ of the
range of fundamentals within which multiple equilibria may arise.
Upper bound φ The tangency conditions between the function Cφ =
F [απ + ϕh(π)− φ] and the 45◦ line are:
π = F [απ + ϕh(π)− φ] (33)
1 = f [απ + ϕh(π)− φ] · £α+ ϕh0(π)¤ (34)
From equation (34), recalling that by assumption π > π0, we have:
9We are grateful to Paul Masson for providing us with the Gauss codes of the graphs
of his 1999 paper.
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απ + ϕh(π)− φ = f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸
(35)
where f−1 (·) : [0, f(0)]→ <+ denotes the inverse function of f (·) that takes
positive values.
Substituting out π and rearranging yields:
φ = αF [απ + ϕh(π)− φ] + ϕh
©
F [απ + ϕh(π)− φ]
ª
−f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸
(36)
Finally, substituting out απ + ϕg(π) − φ given by equation (35) into
equation (36), we obtain:
φ = αF
½
f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸¾
+ ϕh
µ
F
½
f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸¾¶
−f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸
(37)
Proposition 5 If α and ϕ are large enough, the upper bound of the range
of fundamentals for which there are multiple equilibria increases with the
probability of devaluation.
Proof. In order to prove this proposition we need to know how h(·) and
h0(·) change with π, i.e. we need to know the sign of h0(π) and of h00(π).
We know from Proposition 3 that h0(π) > 0, ∀π: this is because an increase
in the probability of devaluation decreases the expected rate of return on
assets which in turn makes the risk premium go up through a wealth eﬀect.
From equations (33) and (35) we have:
π = F
¡
f−1
©
L
£
h0(π)
¤ª¢
(38)
where:
L
£
h0(π)
¤
=
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
(39)
We can sign h00(π) applying the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) to equa-
tion (38). Define:
G
£
π, h0(π)
¤
≡ π − F
¡
f−1
©
L
£
h0(π)
¤ª¢
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Then:
dh0(π)
dπ
= − ∂G/∂π
∂G/∂h0(π)
where:
∂G/∂π = 1
and
∂G/∂h0(π) = − ∂F
∂f−1
· ∂f
−1
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
< 0
since ∂F∂f−1 > 0 ∀f
−1 being F the cdf of a normal distribution; ∂f
−1
∂L < 0
being f−1 the inverse function of a normal pdf that takes positive values
and, by the Inverse Function Theorem,
¡
f−1
¢0
= 1/f 0; and, finally, being
from equation (39):
∂L
∂h0
=
−ϕ
{[α+ ϕh0(π)]}2 < 0, ∀h
0
Then:
dh0(π)
dπ
= − 1
− ∂F∂f−1 · ∂f
−1
∂L · ∂L∂h0
> 0
Applying the Chain rule to equation (37) we find how φ changes with π:
∂φ
∂π
= α · ∂F
∂f−1
· ∂f
−1
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
· ∂h
0
∂π
+ϕ · ∂h
∂F
· ∂F
∂f−1
· ∂f
−1
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
· ∂h
0
∂π
− ∂f
−1
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
· ∂h
0
∂π
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂F
∂f−1
µ
α+ ϕ
∂h
∂F
¶
− 1| {z }
>0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ·
∂f−1
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
· ∂h
0
∂π| {z }
>0
> 0
for α and ϕ large enough
Lower bound φ Recall that we are assuming π < π0, although this is not
essential to the derivation of what follows.
The tangency conditions between the function Cφ = F [απ + ϕh(π)− φ]
and the 45◦ line are:
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π = F [απ + ϕh(π)− φ] (40)
1 = f [απ + ϕh(π)− φ] · £α+ ϕh0(π)¤ (41)
From equation (41) we have (recall that f−1 (·) is defined as the inverse
function of f (·) that takes positive values, and thus we need to change the
sign of απ + ϕh(π)− φ, being this negative since π < π0):
−
£
απ + ϕh(π)− φ
¤
= f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸
(42)
Substituting out π and rearranging we obtain:
φ = αF
½
−f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸¾
+ ϕh
µ
F
½
−f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸¾¶
+f−1
∙
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
¸
(43)
Proposition 6 If α and ϕ are large enough, the lower bound of the range
of fundamentals for which there are multiple equilibria increases with the
probability of devaluation.
Proof. In order to prove this proposition we need to know the sign of
h0(π) and of h00(π). By Proposition 3 h0(π) > 0 ∀π. From equations (40)
and (42) we have:
π = F
¡
−f−1
©
L
£
h0(π)
¤ª¢
(44)
where:
L
£
h0(π)
¤
=
1
α+ ϕh0(π)
(45)
Again, we can sign h00(π) applying the IFT to equation (44). Define:
G
£
π, h0(π)
¤
≡ π − F
¡
−f−1
©
L
£
h0(π)
¤ª¢
Then:
dh0(π)
dπ
= − ∂G/∂π
∂G/∂h0(π)
where:
∂G/∂π = 1
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and
∂G/∂h0(π) = − ∂F
∂ (−f−1) ·
∂
¡
−f−1
¢
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
> 0
since ∂F∂(−f−1) > 0 ∀
¡
−f−1
¢
;
∂(−f−1)
∂L > 0, and from equation (45):
∂L
∂h0
=
−ϕ
{[α+ ϕh0(π)]}2 < 0, ∀h
0
Then:
dh0(π)
dπ
= − 1
− ∂F∂(−f−1) · ∂(−f
−1)
∂L · ∂L∂h0
< 0
From (43) we have:
∂φ
∂π
= α · ∂F
∂ (−f−1) ·
∂
¡
−f−1
¢
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
· ∂h
0
∂π
+ϕ · ∂h
∂F
· ∂F
∂ (−f−1) ·
∂
¡
−f−1
¢
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
· ∂h
0
∂π
−
∂
¡
−f−1
¢
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
· ∂h
0
∂π
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂F
∂ (−f−1)
µ
α+ ϕ
∂h
∂F
¶
− 1| {z }
>0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ·
∂
¡
−f−1
¢
∂L
· ∂L
∂h0
· ∂h
0
∂π| {z }
>0
> 0
for α and ϕ large enough
Propositions 5 and 6 imply that an increase in the probability of devalu-
ation shifts to the right the interval of fundamentals within which multiple
equilibria may arise. This makes more diﬃcult for the emerging country to
avoid dropping in the multiple equilibria range by running very good fun-
damentals. Conversely, running bad fundamentals increases the chance that
equation (31) holds with a unique equilibrium characterized by a high crisis
probability. Notice that if α and ϕ are small enough, then ∂φ∂π ,
∂φ
∂π < 0 and an
increase in the probability of devaluation makes the region for multiple equi-
libria shift to the left. We see, then, that taking into account investors’ risk
aversion makes a sound fiscal policy more compelling to the policymaker.
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2.5 Adding linkages through competitiveness eﬀects
The literature reviewed in the introduction emphasizes that trade linkages,
both bilateral and with third markets, are among the main channels of
contagion. In this subsection a terms of trade eﬀect is introduced in the
model following Masson (1999). However, we extend Masson’s contribution
by modeling the policymaker as an optimizing agent.10
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the world consists of three coun-
tries, the US, the emerging market a, and the emerging market b. We assume
that the emerging markets trade balance as a proportion to nominal GDP
evolves as follows:
tbit = tb
i
+ ςRERit, i = a, b (46)
where tbit = dTBit/P itY it , dTBit is the nominal value of the trade balance, tbi
is a constant, and RER is the (log) real eﬀective exchange rate, which gives
a weight wi on country j and (1−wi) on the US, with i, j = a, b, i 6= j, i.e.:
RERit = (1− wi)
£
ln(eit)− (pit − p∗t )
¤
+ wi
h
ln(eijt )− (pit − p
j
t )
i
where eit and e
ij
t are the country i’s nominal exchange rates vis-a-vis the
US dollar and the country j’s currency respectively. Since ln(eit)− ln(e
j
t ) =
ln(eijt ), then we have:
RERit = ln(e
i
t)− (pit − p∗t )− wi
h
ln(ejt )− (p
j
t − p∗t )
i
(47)
Equation (47) shows that a devaluation of country b’s currency vis-a-vis
the US dollar (that is, an increasing competitiveness of country b on the
American market) decreases RERat , that is the general competitiveness of
country a. We can refer to this as to a competitiveness eﬀect. Assuming for
sake of simplicity that tbi = 0 for i = a, b, we can approximate the change
in the trade balance tbt for country a by the total diﬀerential:
∆tbat+1 = ς∆RER
a
t+1
= ς
h¡
πat+1 − 1
¢
∆ea − wa(πbt+1 − 1)∆eb
i
where, as in Subsection 2.2, we have assumed that US prices are normalized
to 1, that relative PPP between each single emerging market’s currency and
10See Berger and Wagner (2005) for a diﬀerent way of extending the Masson’s model.
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the US dollar holds so that ∆pit+1 = ∆e
i for i, j = a, b, and where πbt+1 is
the probability of devaluation of country b’s currency at time t+ 1.
We assume that the social welfare is aﬀected by the change in the trade
balance, then the policymaker’s welfare loss function under trade competi-
tion is given by:
LaTt+1 =
¡
uat+1
¢2
+
¡
∆dat+1
¢2 − (∆tbat+1)2 + δΓat+1
Proposition 7 The probability of devaluation of one country depends on the
probability of devaluations of its trading partners (πbt) through trade eﬀects.
It is increasing in πbt . Even if the trade competitiveness eﬀect is absent, if
there is a devaluation in country b, there can be a devaluation in country a
through common lender eﬀects.
Proof. Given:h
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equation (28) becomes:
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and
αT = 2 (∆ea)2
n£
ζ2 + (dat + z
a
t )
¤2 − ς2o
Now the probability of devaluation in country a depends on the prob-
ability of devaluation in b, πbt , through a further channel, since πat+1 =
Pr[V aTt+1 < 0] will increase with the probability of devaluation of country b’s
currency.
This shows how contagion can occur because of trade competitiveness
as well as wealth eﬀects and time-varying risk aversion. The specification
of the two countries’ trade balance as dependent on the real exchange rate
makes the devaluation expectations depend on trade competitiveness. This
framework can give a complete picture of how contagion works. In fact, a
portfolio eﬀect, a competitiveness eﬀect, or both can increase the probability
of devaluation in one country as a consequence of the expected devaluation
in another country. The link between the expectations of devaluation in the
two countries is provided by the inclusion of the risk premium and by trade
competitiveness on a third market. Finally, the crisis can also be triggered
simultaneously in the two countries by a common global shock captured by
the rate of interest of a risk-free bond issued by the industrialized country.
The empirical evidence provided by, for example, Glick and Rose (1999),
according to which contagion tends to occur as a consequence of trade links
and competitiveness eﬀects, is consistent with the theoretical model here
presented.
3 Policy measures to avoid crises and contagion
Recently, a number of authors have invoked some sort of restrictions on
capital mobility in order to stabilize the international financial system. For
example, Krugman (1999) argues that countries which cannot adopt either
currency unions or free floating exchange rates should limit capital flows.
Stiglitz (1999) endorses the same view with special reference to developing
countries. Eichengreen et al. (1995) argue that as real markets adjust slug-
gishly to shocks, a second best can be achieved by “throwing sand in the
wheels” of international finance through a global foreign exchange transac-
tion tax in the spirit of Tobin (1978). This would help prevent destabilizing
speculation in international financial markets and make capital mobility
compatible with modest autonomy in monetary and macroeconomic policy.
These views were broadly discussed in the aftermath of the frequent
currency crises of the 1990s. In this Section we analyze the eﬀects of such
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restrictions on the probability of transmission of crises in the context of
our model. We distinguish between the eﬀects of two diﬀerent measures:
we define the first as capital controls, which can be thought of as an ad-
ministrative or direct intervention and amounts to outright prohibition or
discretionary approval of certain cross-border capital movements; the sec-
ond is a Tobin tax, i.e. a market-based or indirect control which aims at
discouraging capital movements through cost-increasing measures.
3.1 Capital controls
As mentioned above, one way to stabilize international financial markets
could be by means of administrative restrictions on capital flows. Montiel
and Reinhart (1999) show that, unlike policies of sterilized intervention,
capital controls exert an eﬀect on the composition of inflows, rather than on
their overall volume, in the direction of reducing the share of short-term and
portfolio flows with respect to FDI. Furthermore, as documented by Edwards
(1999), the introduction of such restrictions involves a number of issues
regarding the sequencing of reforms in emerging markets, the eﬀectiveness
and timing of controls, the kind of flows to be restricted (whether inflows or
outflows), as well as the maturity of capital flows to be discouraged.
The present setup cannot accommodate for such features of capital con-
trols. Thus we resort to modeling this restriction introducing a no-short-
selling constraint on either dollar- and local currency-denominated risky
assets held by private investors:
x∗ms , x
m
s ≥ 0 (49)
In order to simplify notation and make the argument clearer, we assume
that the marginal eﬀect on expected utility of relaxing the nonnegative con-
straints (49) is invariant across diﬀerent currency-denominated assets issued
by the same country, and that the market value of dollar denominated debt
is equal to the market value of local currency denominated debt converted
to dollars, i.e. B∗ms = Bms /ems . As shown below, these assumptions allow
for the same eﬀect of capital controls on country m’s assets denominated in
diﬀerent currencies.
Proposition 8 The introduction of a no-short-selling constraint on risky
assets reduces the probability of currency devaluation.
Proof. When the constraints (49) are added to the model, the Euler
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equations (3) and (4) change as follows:
u0(Cs −Xs)B∗ms = βEs
©
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¶¾
+ vms+1(51)
where vms+1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (2) at time
s+ 1, denoting the increase in expected lifetime utility that would result if
the current constraint were relaxed by one unit. It is assumed to be equal
across assets issued by the same country. Going again through the steps
discussed in Section 2 leads to the following expression for the risk premium
on dollar-denominated risky assets under capital controls, for s = t:
Et(1 + r∗mt+1)− (1 + r
∗f
t+1) = −(1 + r
∗f
t+1)Cov
½
βu0(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
u0(Ct −Xt)
, r∗mt+1
¾
−
vmt+1(1 + r
∗f
t+1)
B∗mt u0(Ct −Xt)
= ρmt+1 −Θmt+1 (52)
where ρmt+1 is the risk premium we derived in Section 2 under free capital
mobility and
Θmt+1 =
vms+1(1 + r
∗f
t+1)
B∗mt u0(Ct −Xt)
.
An analogous expression can be obtained for the risk premium on local
currency-denominated risky assets:
Et
∙
emt
emt+1
(1 + rmt+1)
¸
− (1 + r∗ft+1) = −(1 + r
∗f
t+1)Cov
½
βu0(Ct+1 −Xt+1)
u0(Ct −Xt)
, r∗mt+1
¾
−
ems vms+1(1 + r
∗f
t+1)
Bmt u0(Ct −Xt)
= ρmt+1 −Θmt+1 (53)
where the third equality derives from the assumptions that the risk premium
under free capital mobility ρmt+1 is equal across country m’s assets and that
B∗ms = Bms /ems .
The new expression for the probability of devaluation of country m’s
currency under capital controls, πmt+1, is, therefore:
πmt+1 = F [απ
m
t+1 + ϕ(ρ
m
t+1 −Θmt+1)− φmt+1] < πmt+1 (31’)
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since F [·] is an increasing function.
Proposition 8 implies that the introduction of capital controls in the
form of administrative measures can help stabilize the international financial
system through a reduction of the risk premium and, in turn, a reduction of
the probability of currency devaluation. In fact, this leads to a decreasing
contagion because as a country’s probability of devaluation is shocked, the
eﬀect on the risk premium on other countries’ assets will be damped by the
term Θ deriving from capital controls.
3.2 Tobin tax
We now apply our model to answer the following question: do indirect capital
controls in the form of a Tobin tax, i.e. a foreign exchange transactions tax,
reduce the probability of contagion of financial crises?
One trivial eﬀect of the introduction of a Tobin tax is to reduce the
crisis probability through an increase in the fiscal revenues of the emerging
market’s government. This can be seen from equations (28)− (31): ceteris
paribus, an increase of fiscal revenues will decrease the government deficit
and thus improve the fundamentals; this, in turn, will reduce the crisis
probability expectations formulated by private agents. However, this is not
an eﬀect peculiar to the Tobin tax since it may be exerted by any measure of
fiscal consolidation adopted by the policymaker. It is far more interesting,
therefore, to detect what is the influence of a Tobin tax on private investors’
equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 9 The introduction of a Tobin tax does not aﬀect the risk
premium demanded on risky assets, and thus does not aﬀect the probability
of devaluation.
Proof. Remembering that the budget constraint is expressed in dollars,
levying a tax with rate τm on each foreign exchange transactions modifies
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the international investor’s budget constraint (2) as follows:
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and the FOCs (3) and (4) remain unchanged since:
ems+1(1− τm)
¡
Ims+1 +B
m
s+1
¢
ems (1− τm)Bms
=
ems+1
¡
Ims+1 +B
m
s+1
¢
ems Bms
.
Proposition 9 implies that levying a tax on foreign exchange transactions
leaves unchanged the equilibrium returns on the risky asset and, thus, the
representative investor’s equilibrium behavior. Therefore the risk premium
and, in turn, the probability of currency devaluation and transmission of
crises remain unchanged.
Interestingly enough, this result contradicts Cordella (2003) which as-
serts that in a “bank run” model controls in the form of a tax on short-
term capital inflows can increase expected returns by preventing bank runs.
This, the argument goes, may lead to an increase of gross investments in the
emerging market. Conversely, in the international asset pricing framework
here presented the same kind of tax does not aﬀect rates of return implying
that the marginal investment decisions are unchanged.
Advocates of the Tobin tax as a mean of stabilization of international
financial markets argue that it should be universally and uniformly levied in
order to be eﬀective (Eichengreen et al. 1995). Again, in our framework a
Tobin tax levied universally on all countries’ securities and with a uniform
rate is ineﬀective.
4 Conclusion
The existing literature presents an unsatisfactory partition of explanations
of contagion between theories based on fundamentals and theories based
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on investors’ behavior. The model presented in this paper nests both the
main sources of contagion of financial crises, and adds another dimension of
non-linearity to the Jeanne-Masson model increasing the likelihood of self-
fulfilling equilibria. It shows that financial crises can be transmitted across
seemingly unrelated countries (e.g. Russia and Brazil) through the risk at-
titudes of international investors. Thus, to understand financial crises it is
not suﬃcient to look at the countries in question, but also at the portfo-
lios of international investors. International business cycle considerations
through the wealth eﬀects can also play a role in the incidence of financial
crises. The model also suggests that bond spreads, in the event of a finan-
cial crisis, would change in emerging markets depending on the pattern of
portfolio holdings of international investors. Better risk-management can
help reduce the incidence of financial crises through diversification. The
model can help better understand the transmission of crises across markets
which do not seem to be directly related to each other by emphasizing the
role of capital flows and thus, integrating international trade and finance
considerations. Finally, an extension of the model to introduce a no-short-
selling constraint shows that frictions in the international capital flows can
help reduce the instability originating from the self fulfilling expectations of
rational investors.
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Figure 3. Critical values of fundamentals.
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